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THE LIMITS OF CONJECTURE: POLITICAL LIBERALISM, COUNTER-
RADICALISATION, AND UNREASONABLE RELIGIOUS VIEWS 
 
Abstract 
Originally proposed by John Rawls, the idea of reasoning from conjecture is popular among the proponents of political 
liberalism in normative political theory. Reasoning from conjecture consists in discussing with fellow citizens who are 
attracted to illiberal and antidemocratic ideas by focusing on their religious or otherwise comprehensive doctrines, 
attempting to convince them that such doctrines actually call for loyalty to liberal democracy.  Our goal is to criticise 
reasoning from conjecture as a tool aimed at persuasion and, in turn, at improving the stability of liberal democratic 
institutions. To pursue this goal, we use as case study real-world efforts to counter-radicalise at-risk Muslim citizens, 
which, at first glance, reasoning from conjecture seems well-placed to contribute to. This case study helps us to argue 
that the supporters of reasoning from conjecture over-intellectualise opposition to liberal democracy and what 
societies can do to counter it. Specifically, they (i) underestimate how few members of society can effectively perform 
reasoning from conjecture; (ii) overlook that the burdens of judgement, a key notion for political liberals, highlight 
how dim the prospects of reasoning from conjecture are; and (iii) do not pay attention to the causes of religious 
personsÕ opposition to liberal democracy. However, not everything is lost for political liberals, provided that they 
redirect attention to different and under-researched resources contained in RawlsÕs theory. In closing, we briefly 
explain how such resources are much better placed than reasoning from conjecture to provide guidance relative to 
counter-radicalisation in societies (i) populated by persons who do not generally hold anything close to a fully worked 
out and internally consistent comprehensive doctrine, and (ii) where political institutions should take responsibility 
for at least part of the existing alienation from liberal democratic values.  
 
Keywords 
Reasoning from conjecture; political liberalism; counter-radicalisation; burdens of judgement; Aarhus model; John 
Rawls; Islamism; pluralism; multiculturalism; disagreement. 
 
The governments of many European countries are currently extremely concerned about 
radicalisation, that is, Ôthe rejection of the key dimensions of democratic culture that are at the 
centre of the European value systemÕ (Rabasa and Benard 2015: 3) Although radicalisation comes 
in many different forms, since 9/11 and even more so since the rise of ISIS, a lot of attention has 
been paid specifically to Islamism. Part of the effort to address Islamism has consisted in attempts 
at counter-radicalisation, aimed at stopping Ômembers from non-radicalised populations from 
being radicalised without the use of heavy-handed coercive or repressive measuresÕ (Schmid 2013, 
50). 
As exemplified by ÔPreventÕ in the UK, counter-radicalisation programmes are often hugely 
controversial, and understandably so. Under the Prevent strategy, the employees of public 
authorities, including school teachers and academics, have a duty to watch out for and report 
anyone in the process or at risk of being radicalised. As pointed out by many, these sorts of 
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strategies, which turn counter-radicalisation into surveillance, undermine the already strained 
relationship of trust between the state and Muslim communities (Thomas 2015).1 
Within political theory, it seems fair to expect the influential framework of political 
liberalism, originally proposed by John Rawls, to be able to offer guidance as to how to pursue 
counter-radicalisation in a less problematic way. Rawlsian political liberalism is centred on the idea 
that unity and stability are possible in liberal-democratic societies despite ineliminable far-reaching 
disagreement, religious as well as political, among their members. Moreover, a significant trend 
within recent political liberal literature is to endorse and pay close attention to so-called reasoning 
from conjecture, a form of discourse that has much in common with the very task of counter-
radicalisation. Indeed, reasoning from conjecture (hereafter ÔconjectureÕ, for short) is about 
discussing with religious citizens who appear to be drawn to ideas that are in tension with liberal 
democracy, in an attempt to change their mind about them. 
Our goal in this paper is to criticise conjecture as proposed by political liberals, using the 
counter-radicalisation of at-risk Muslim citizens as a case study that illustrates its shortcomings. 
The counter-radicalisation of Muslim citizens is particularly apt because conjectural reasoning 
addressed at Muslim interlocutors constitutes the main example in the literature supporting 
conjecture. This case will help us demonstrate how the literature on conjecture over-intellectualises 
citizensÕ detachment from and opposition to liberal democracy, as well as what should be done 
about them. We aim to argue that these matters should be understood differently, and that 
Rawlsian political liberalism already contains underappreciated resources to help us move in the 
right direction. 
Our argument, which discusses the radicalisation of Muslim citizens, is particularly 
important in times when there is a backlash against multiculturalism Ð a backlash that is analysed, 
in one way or another, by several contributions to this special issue. Indeed, our analysis stresses 
even more emphatically than the supporters of conjectural reasoning how religious and cultural 
pluralism is not the problem that needs to be addressed for the sake of the stability of liberal 
democracy. As we will point out, radicalisation does not stem from doctrinal beliefs but has social, 
economic and political roots.     
Section 1 presents RawlsÕs account of political liberalism after explaining why it seems 
legitimate to expect that it should be able to help us with the task of counter-radicalisation. Next, 
Section 2 focuses on and reconstructs the burgeoning literature on conjecture. Starting with a 
contrast between conjecture and a few examples of real-world counter-radicalisation initiatives, 
																																								 																				
1 Prevent has been heavily criticised from the pages of newspapers like The Guardian and The Independent, as exemplified 
by Maynard (2015) and Versi (2017). 
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Section 3 turns to criticising it. Specifically, we demonstrate that the supporters of conjecture (i) 
underestimate how few citizens can function as conjecturers; (ii) fail to notice that key notions 
from within Rawlsian political liberalism, concerning the so-called burdens of judgement, suggest 
that the prospects of conjecture are dim; and (iii) overlook the root causes of radicalisation. In the 
concluding section, we hint at alternative and underexplored theoretical resources from RawlsÕs 
political liberalism, which are more promising to understand how to address opposition to liberal 
democracy. 
 
1. Why Political Liberalism? 
It seems legitimate to expect that RawlsÕs model of political liberalism and the work many others 
have done to further develop it be able to help us think about the counter-radicalisation of at-risk 
Muslim citizens. This is because one of the defining features of RawlsÕs political liberalism is the 
acknowledgment that disagreement, about the good life and religious matters as well as political 
views, among the friends of liberal democracy but also between them and its critics, is an 
ineliminable fact of liberal democratic life. At the same time, Rawls does not lose faith in the 
possibility of a degree of social unity and, in turn, of stable and legitimate liberal democracies. 
Consequently, Rawlsian political liberalism seems uniquely well-placed to provide guidance as to 
how to counter-radicalise religious views while taking into full consideration the huge difficulty of 
solving disagreements with views we do not like. Let us then reconstruct RawlsÕs model.  
As we have just mentioned, Rawls believes that to a good extent, the great plurality of views 
on religious matters, conceptions of the good life, philosophical questions and other so-called 
comprehensive issues existing in our societies is simply the product of the exercise of human 
reason. Human judgement is burdened and, therefore, even the best effort to solve complicated 
issues will always be hindered. Even well-intentioned, well-informed and intelligent persons are 
bound to keep disagreeing about religious or otherwise comprehensive matters, locked in what 
Rawls calls Ôreasonable pluralismÕ (Rawls 1996: 54Ð58). 
At first glance, the fact of reasonable pluralism seems fatal to the legitimacy and stability of 
liberal democratic institutions. If, as Rawls believes, legitimacy is given by wide justifiability in 
society, how can any single framework of institutions ever pass the test and be justifiable across 
the mutually incompatible comprehensive doctrines populating reasonable pluralism? Similarly, it 
seems impossible that citizens endorsing comprehensive doctrines that are very different from one 
another can all find appropriate reasons to accept the same institutional framework. Appropriate 
reasons are not just Ômodus vivendiÕ reasons, requiring citizens to obey a set of institutions for the 
time being, until their faction musters enough power to impose their sectarian view on the rest of 
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society. According to Rawls, Ôstability for the right reasonsÕ is necessary for any political 
arrangement to be truly stable (Rawls 1996: 391Ð92).  
Rawls rescues the possibility of a legitimate and stable liberal democratic order by pointing 
out that the political conception behind such order can work like a module, capable of fitting into 
the most diverse comprehensive doctrines, which can then form an Ôoverlapping consensusÕ over 
it. This political conception reaches no deeper than basic political ideas of (i) society as fair system 
of cooperation for everyoneÕs mutual advantage and (ii) persons as free and equal members of 
such cooperative system. Also, it only includes general liberal commitments, which can then be 
specified in different ways by different citizens Ð equal basic liberties, equal opportunities, the 
acknowledgement of a special priority for liberties and opportunities as well as the provision of 
all-purpose means to make them effective for everyone (Rawls 1997: 774). According to Rawls, 
when political power is exercised, especially if the issue at hand concerns constitutional essentials 
and issues of basic justice, decision-makers have a duty of civility to advance at least one Ôpublic 
reasonÕ in support of their decision Ð which is to say, to ground it in the agreed-upon political 
conception, making the resulting law or policy widely justifiable and therefore legitimate (Rawls 
1996: 212Ð54). A legitimate liberal democratic order is stable if enough members of society accept 
the political conception. 
Now, Rawls explains that although the political conception behind the liberal democratic 
order can fit into very different comprehensive doctrines, it is only acceptable to so-called 
reasonable persons, defined by two features. First, reasonable persons want the terms of 
cooperation to be fair to every person, conceived of as free and equal, not just to the groups they 
belong to. Second, they accept the burdens of judgement and are therefore unwilling to impose 
their own comprehensive doctrines on others through the coercive power of the state (Rawls 1996: 
48Ð58). 
The spread of reasonableness is crucial for the stability of liberal democratic institutions. 
However, Rawls notes that regardless of how well-established liberal democratic institutions are, 
unreasonable persons will always be present. Especially when they threaten to become too 
numerous, the rest of society is therefore left with the task Ôto contain them so that they do not 
undermine the unity and justice of societyÕ (Rawls 1996: xix).  
This task should capture the attention of anyone interested in the counter-radicalisation of 
at-risk Muslim citizens. Indeed, the task of counter-radicalising religious persons who are being 
radicalised into opposition to the basic tenets of liberal democracy appears to fall neatly under the 
umbrella of the containment of unreasonable views. Then, what do Rawls and other political 
liberals suggest regarding how to go about containing unreasonable beliefs? Very surprisingly, 
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Rawls never looks at what containment should look like, and this topic has received very little 
focused attention by political liberals more in general.2  
Still, political liberals have recently produced a flurry of literature on conjecture. Conjecture 
is not explicitly brought to bear on containment by Rawls, but a few theorists who have developed 
the notion have containment or related notions in mind. Conjecture seems highly relevant not only 
to containment in general, but also to the specific task of counter-radicalising religious citizens. 
Indeed, it is centrally about the possibility of discussing other personsÕ comprehensive doctrine so 
as to show them that in contrast to what they might think, their doctrine is fully hospitable to 
reasonable political ideas.  Therefore, from now on we will focus on conjecture, using the counter-
radicalisation of at-risk Muslim citizens as a case study to highlight the limitations of this popular 
political liberal notion.  
 
2. Reconstructing Reasoning from Conjecture 
The attention recently paid to conjecture takes its lead from RawlsÕs brief analysis of forms of 
valuable political discourse that are distinct from the duty of citizens to provide public reasons in 
support of important political decisions. Conjecture is described by Rawls as follows: 
 
[W]e argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people's basic doctrines, religious or secular, 
and try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political 
conception that can provide a basis for public reasons. [É] We must openly explain our intentions and 
state that we do not assert the premises from which we argue, but that we proceed as we do to clear up 
what we take to be a misunderstanding on others' part, and perhaps equally on ours (Rawls 1997: 786Ð
787). 
 
To fill the gaps in RawlsÕs extremely sketchy account of conjecture, several political liberals have 
gone back to it. Among them, Andrew March deserves a special mention in that he frames a large 
part of his research as an actual instance of conjecture in RawlsÕs sense of the term. His focus is 
on Islam and existing tensions between, on the one hand, the acceptance of the idea of a reasonable 
liberal democratic order and, on the other hand, certain interpretations of the QurÕan that, for 
																																								 																				
2
 A notable exception is provided by Jonathan Quong, who calls for the curtailment of unreasonable personsÕ right to 
free speech and other basic liberties in crisis situations where they pose a real threat to the stability of the liberal 
democratic order (Quong 2004: 323Ð335). However, as argued by Gabriele Badano and Alasia Nuti, given the special 
value that liberals place on everyone having equal liberties, QuongÕs ÔharshÕ containment strategies cannot be the whole 
story, and should be complemented by ÔsofterÕ containment measures to be adopted earlier on the way to a real threat 
to stability (Badano and Nuti 2018: 153-154).  
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example, depict the hijra, or emigration from any non-Muslim country, as compulsory and indeed 
affirm that no Muslim can recognise the authority of a non-Muslim state as legitimate.  
MarchÕs goal is Ôto investigate what is involved Islamically in arguing for the religious 
legitimacy of liberal citizenship in such a way that believers (particularly those open to arguments 
against liberal citizenship) might be convincedÕ (March 2009: 13). In pursuing this goal, he 
examines traditions of Islamic law and of interpretation of the QurÕan more in general, bringing 
together potentially problematic ideas such as hijra and jihad with existing liberal interpretations of 
them and other concepts such as aman, or the contractual obligation requiring Muslims to be loyal 
to the states that provide protection to them. According to March, this conjectural effort leads to 
the conclusion that the most plausible interpretation of the Muslim tradition is consistent with 
liberal views of society as a system of cooperation among Muslim and non-Muslim equals. 
What is the purpose of this and other conjectural efforts? Rawls remains vague about what 
conjecture is for. Although other political liberals have explored the purpose of conjecture, some 
do not draw any link with the task of containing unreasonable views. For example, Alessandro 
Ferrara believes that conjecture is meant to bolster the legitimacy, not the stability of reasonable 
liberal democratic institutions; by searching the comprehensive doctrines of unreasonable persons, 
it aims to identify a foothold for a justification for such institutions that can be directed specifically 
at them (Ferrara 2014: 71Ð72). Similarly, Micah Schwartzman is not concerned about instability, 
but about communitarian objections to political liberalism stressing the high personal costs that 
accepting reasonableness as governing political decision-making has for religious citizens 
(Schwartzman 2012: 523). 
However, March believes that as long as conjecturers are not only open with their 
interlocutors, but also sincerely believe in the plausibility of their interpretation of the target 
doctrine, conjectures constitute an attempt at persuasion Ôfor the right reasonsÕ, aimed at enhancing 
the stability of liberal democratic institutions (March 2009: 23Ð33). This finally brings us to the 
conceptual area of containment, which is explicitly listed by Matthew Clayton and David Stevens 
(2014: 73Ð76) as one of the reasons for engaging with unreasonable religious citizens through a 
discussion of their comprehensive doctrines. 
Whatever else conjecture might achieve, containment through persuasion is the purpose we 
wish to take centre-stage in this paper. The very idea of engaging in conjectural reasoning, trying 
to show how the belief system of oneÕs interlocutors might be closer than they realise to the basic 
ideas of liberal democracy, seems inextricably connected to the project of generating a perspectival 
shift in them Ð one that will hopefully lead them to self-consciously become loyal to liberal 
democracy. Moreover, the project of counter-radicalising at-risk Muslim citizens, which is this 
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paperÕs case study, is one and the same thing as an attempt to persuade them to accept or hold on 
to the basic commitments of liberal democracy. Therefore, it is the promise and suitability of 
conjecture to help contain the spread of unreasonable views that we aim to evaluate, and the case 
of counter-radicalisation will assist us in our analysis. 
A final point we wish to make, which is meant to clarify how wide the range of conjectural 
activities we plan to criticise is, concerns the question of who the conjecturers should be, starting 
with the issue of how external conjecturers need to be to their interlocutorsÕ system of beliefs. On 
this issue, several authors push conjecture well beyond RawlsÕs original account. As we have seen, 
Rawls stresses that conjecturers do not share the premises from which they argue. This appears to 
have led some proponents of conjecture to interpret it as something to be constructed from a 
broad tradition of thought that is not your own, as exemplified by March, who is not a Muslim, 
conjecturing through his published work that the most plausible interpretation of Islam is 
hospitable to reasonable liberal democratic ideas. 
Still, other supporters of conjecture appear to (explicitly or implicitly) reject such limitations, 
opening the door to conjecturers belonging to the same broad tradition of faith as their 
interlocutors (Schwartzman 2012: 528 and fn.) or even sharing the premises of their conjectural 
arguments.3 Among them, Clayton and Stevens are particularly keen to argue that conjecturers 
should be as internal to their interlocutorsÕ belief system as possible.  
Although they do not label their account of discursive engagement ÔconjectureÕ, Clayton and 
Stevens quote RawlsÕs description of conjectural reasoning at length when defining it (Clayton and 
Stevens 2014: 82), and other commentators have in fact already classed them as proponents of 
conjecture (Wong forthcoming). They propose that the task to challenge unreasonable religious 
views should be taken up by Ôthose who share the same doctrinal beliefsÕ, presumably minus the 
unreasonable elements (Clayton and Stevens 2014: 82). This is because those who only argue 
hypothetically risk appearing ÔdisingenuousÕ to their audience or, in other words, being perceived 
as someone who is much more interested in bending to a political end the resources of the target 
doctrine than offering a plausible interpretation of it (Clayton and Stevens 2014: 80). Consequently, 
the members of such audience would likely be extremely suspicious, conjectures fall on deaf ears, 
and persuasion fail. 
Clayton and StevensÕs proposed account of discursive engagement will then be very different 
from MarchÕs traditional picture of conjectures as advancing, in a hermeneutical way, what 
																																								 																				
3 Ferrara discusses as examples of conjecture the attempts made by the Catholic Robert Bellah and the Jew Michael 
Walzer to build arguments supporting basic liberal democratic political ideas by drawing respectively on the Catholic 
and the Jewish traditions (Ferrara 2014: 76Ð81). Nothing in FerraraÕs reconstruction leads the reader to believe that 
either Bellah or Walzer rejects the premises of their arguments. 
8 
	
conjecturers take to be the most plausible interpretation of someone elseÕs religious doctrine. If 
conjecturers are reasonable members of the same community of faith as the citizens drawn to 
unreasonable beliefs, conjectures will mostly become an attempt to convince someone that, in 
Clayton and StevensÕs words, they are actually Ômistaken about the godsÕ and at least some of their 
Ôreligious views are mistakenÕ (Clayton and Stevens 2014: 78 and 79, respectively). As an example, 
Clayton and Stevens mention Abdullahi Ahmed An-NaÕim, an eminent advocate of a 
reformulation of Islamic Sharia Law that makes Sharia consistent with constitutional democracy. 
In a nutshell, An-NaÕim makes the case that the eternal message of Islam is contained in 
MuhammadÕs earlier Mecca teachings, not in the later and more exclusionary Medina teachings, 
and that present-day conditions are ripe to switch. 
Interestingly, Clayton and StevensÕs case in support of conjecturers being members of the 
same community of faith as the citizens they plan to engage interlocks with their argument to the 
effect that conjecturers must be common citizens, not public officials and not even Ôpolitical 
philosophersÕ. According to them, no one in public office (or, so it seems, no one arguing for 
liberal democracy from a high-visibility platform) should explicitly endorse any specific religious 
or otherwise comprehensive doctrine when performing their roles, or else they risk alienating the 
reasonable citizens from society at large who do not share it (Clayton and Stevens 2014, 80Ð81). 
However, as we have seen, Clayton and Stevens believe that discursive engagement only promises 
to be persuasive if its targets are reassured that the reasonable persons who have reached out to 
them are committed to the main tenets of the worldview they are arguing about. Consequently, 
conjecture should be for common citizens to carry out - a position that contradicts March, who is 
himself both a conjecturer and a political philosopher, and that has been criticised in an attempt 
to bring politicians back among possible conjecturers (Wong forthcoming). 
Clayton and StevensÕs argument in support of conjecturers being internal to their 
interlocutorsÕ system of religious beliefs has appeal, especially for perspectives, like ours, interested 
in conjecture because of its promise to contribute to persuading and, therefore, counter-
radicalising religious citizens. In what follows, we will criticise conjectural reasoning across the 
whole spectrum of positions about how external to oneÕs interlocutorsÕ worldview conjecturers 
need to be (from MarchÕs and what seems to be RawlsÕs original views to Clayton and StevensÕs 
position), and also about who conjecturers should be more in general.  
 
3. Too Much Faith in Conjecture 
Although different scholars specify conjecture in different ways, they are united in understanding 
conjecture as meant to promote a shift in religious personsÕ views by doctrinally engaging them. This 
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Ôdoctrinal routeÕ is not, however, central to the practices of counter-radicalisation that, in European 
states, communities and municipalities have implemented to address Islamism Ð not even to the 
ones that share with conjecture an important element of engagement and discussion. In this 
section, we will argue that this gulf between conjecture and real-world practices of counter-
radicalisation is symptomatic of the fundamental shortcomings of conjectural reasoning. 
 
3.1. Real-world practices of counter-radicalisation 
In recent years, one of the approaches to fight religious radicalisation and Ôhome-grown jihadistsÕ 
that has received great attention by the media is the so-called ÔAarhus modelÕ (Henley 2014; Crouch 
and Henley 2015). The Danish city of Aarhus has developed a holistic approach to counter-
radicalisation, which has been significantly successful at preventing young Muslims from 
radicalising and joining jihadist groups abroad, and even at rehabilitating returning ISIS fighters.4 
The approach is centred on the principle of inclusion and offers participants wide-ranging services, 
i.e., from counselling to support with healthcare, education, employment and housing. Central to 
the approach is the Ômentoring programmeÕ in which participants are assigned a trained mentor 
with whom they can discuss about everything and who can help them Ôto find paths of inclusion 
regarding the activities and tasks in the[ir] daily lifeÕ (Bertelsen 2015: 244). Rather than examining, 
as conjecturers would do, participantsÕ religious beliefs to directly change them, the programme 
aims to Ôtransform the[ir] personal, social, cultural and political motivations into modes of 
participation and citizenshipÕ that Rawlsians would call ÔreasonableÕ (Bertelsen 2015: 243). 
 In Belgium, the city of Mechelen has endorsed an approach to counter-radicalisation that 
is similarly centred on social cohesion and has produced impressive results. The municipality has 
invested in activities that engage all its residents and, especially, the youth. For instance, it 
encourages residents to volunteer for the municipality and participate in local governance. Also, it 
organises after-school activities for vulnerable children and teenagers with the aim of tackling 
isolation and promoting a sense of membership in the city (EUobserver 2016). While Belgium is 
one of the European countries with most jihadist fighters, the large city of Mechelen has registered 
no cases of individuals fleeing the country to fight abroad (EUobserver 2016). 
In the UK, Muslim communities and activists have tended to lead counter-radicalisation 
initiatives without the support of institutions because of the widespread feeling of resentment and 
distrust towards the governmental counter-terrorism agenda promoted by Prevent. For example, 
the community group ÔEngageÕ, which is based in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, runs a programme 
																																								 																				
4 Technically, the ÔAarhus modelÕ represents an approach not only to counter-radicalisation, but also to so-called de-
radicalisation. De-radicalisation programmes deal with suspected or convicted terrorists and with persons who 
otherwise plan to resort to violence (Schmid 2013: 50).  
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aimed at young Muslims who either are at risk of radicalisation or are radicalised. Although 
participants are exposed to interpretations of Islam compatible with liberal democratic values, they 
are also involved in many other activities, which have nothing to do with their religious beliefs, 
such as going on trips and excursions, preparing meals, playing in football tournaments, being 
mentored and helped with CV writing.5 
Often grassroots activities do not touch on religious views at all. An interesting example is 
the initiative led by Jahan Mahmood Ð a military historian researcher based in Birmingham. 
Mahmood organises workshops and screenings to interact with members of Muslim communities 
and explain the contribution of Muslim people to British military campaigns over history (Shabi 
2016). In stressing how, for instance, Punjabi Muslims formed the largest component of the British 
army outside of the UK during World Wars I and II, MahmoodÕs talks aim to reconcile 
participantsÕ religious identity with their citizenship. They intend to provide a powerful counter-
narrative to right-wing populist and Islamist discourses that, in different ways, frame Muslim 
identity as irreconcilable with loyalty to the British state. 
These examples show that although practices of counter-radicalisation within Muslim 
communities and local municipalities involve, like conjecture, engagement and discussion, they 
sharply differ from it in that they are not centred around doctrinal engagement. Either doctrinal 
discussions constitute one of many components of counter-radicalisation programmes or they are 
not even part of the process. Although initially puzzling, this gulf separating conjecture from real-
world counter-radicalisation will not come as a surprise any more once conjecture is closely 
scrutinised. Indeed, as we will show, not only is conjecture extremely difficult to perform 
successfully but it is also oblivious to the complex causes of religious radicalisation. 
 
3.2. Who can be a conjecturer? 
As seen in Section 2, the proponents of conjecture already debate the question of who conjecturers 
should be. When conjecture is performed for the sake of stability, the most urgent problem to 
consider is that not everyone can be a persuasive conjecturer Ð a problem that, as we aim to 
demonstrate, is underappreciated in the literature. Conjecturers should be able to persuasively 
justify a reasonable political conception by drawing on the resources offered by the religious 
doctrine that is endorsed by their audience. Who can plausibly hope to succeed at that?  
Conjecturers cannot simply have some vague knowledge of the religious comprehensive 
doctrine they are conjecturing about; they should have a considerable expertise in it (Schwartzman 
																																								 																				
5 For a description of Engage, see http://muslimview.co.uk/news/dewsbury-muslims-launch-independent-counter-
extremism-project/. 
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2012: 521). In the case of Islam, they need to have gained quite a deep knowledge of the text of 
QurÕan, its various interpretations over time, the historical development of Muslim ethical and 
cultural traditions, and the different sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Otherwise, their conjectural 
attempt is doomed to fail (or, better, it could not even start for lack of its building blocks).  
This necessary desideratum of religious expertise rules out politicians as plausible conjecturers. 
Indeed, we do not usually expect our political elite to be so well-versed in religious doctrines. 
Moreover, it does not seem reasonable to require them to become such experts, considering the 
many other important responsibilities that politicians should fulfil. 
Ordinary citizens are also unsuitable candidates. Indeed, there are not many persons who 
are so knowledgeable about religious systems of beliefs as to be able to seriously attempt to argue 
that, contrary to what some of its followers think, a religious doctrine contains the necessary 
resources to support a reasonable political conception. This consideration applies both to ordinary 
citizens who do not belong to the same broad religious tradition as their audience and to those 
who, instead, are Muslim. As Schwartzman recognises, many religious communities, including 
Islam, simply Ôdelegate the responsibility of answering ethical and political questions to specific 
authoritiesÕ, such as imams (Schwartzman 2012: 540). The adherents of a religious doctrine do not 
generally have a deep knowledge of, say, the central texts of their own religion, let alone an 
understanding of the vast corpus of commentaries developed over time.  
The only apt conjecturers seem to be those who have devoted a considerable amount of 
their time to the study of the particular religious doctrine they intend to conjecture about: (a) 
scholars who may or may not belong to Islam, like An-NaÕim and March; and (b) reasonable leaders 
of religious communities, such as Ajmal Masroor, a Bangladeshi-born British imam who has 
repeatedly spoken out against Islamism in the media and while leading his Friday prayers in 
London.  
However, apt conjecturers should not just be religious expert; they should also have a more 
specific knowledge of exactly what elements of their audienceÕs belief system drive them not to 
endorse reasonable liberal democratic institutions. Indeed, assuming for now that radicalisation 
has doctrinal roots, it is likely that different Muslim citizens who reject basic reasonable political 
ideas do so for different doctrinal reasons. For some, the reason may be their interpretation of the 
inner logic of this or that specific religious precept (e.g., jihad, hijira, or other concepts); others, 
instead, may not prioritise liberal democratic political ideas in case of conflict with religious beliefs 
because of how they understand their religionÕs instructions regarding similar conflict situations. 
In this sense, conjecture is like rhetoric in that it needs to be tailored to a very specific 
audience. Conjecturers should develop their arguments by paying close attention to the particular 
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ways in which some religious citizens see an inconsistency between their religious doctrine and any 
reasonable political conception. Like rhetoric, conjecture requires that those who carry it out 
Ôacknowledge the particular features of individualsÕ,6 i.e., the distinctive ways in which they think 
religiously, interpreting and valuing different doctrinal ideas. Now, although scholars master the 
complexity of Islam, they do not generally have access to the more individualised knowledge that 
seems important to make conjecture persuasive for specific  citizens who might be attracted to 
Islamist views. They are unlike local imams, who frequently interact with the members of their 
communities and, therefore, tend to be better placed to formulate conjectural arguments that are 
as tailored as possible to the specific religious beliefs and ways of thinking of community members. 
In sum, after the mechanics of conjecture are closely examined, it seems that only the leaders 
of religious communities, i.e., imams, are well-placed to be apt conjecturers. However, even when 
conjecture is carried out by apt conjecturers, political liberals should recognise that its prospects 
of success are very limited. Indeed, as we will see, the acknowledgment of the burdens of judgment 
provides resources internal to political liberalism to be deeply sceptical about conjecture. 
 
3.3 Conjecture and the Burdens of Judgement 
The theory behind the burdens of judgement, which we presented in Section 1 as one of the 
defining features of political liberalism, encapsulates a powerful idea that many develop through 
their own personal experience: even if all persons engaged in discussion are intelligent, well-
informed and well-intentioned, it is still likely that they will end up disagreeing about complex 
topics. This is because many factors burden our judgement, including the vagueness of concepts; 
the complexity of the evidence bearing on numerous issues; the fact that different considerations 
often hold on both sides of an issue; and the extent to which the way we interpret concepts, assess 
evidence and weigh conflicting considerations is shaped by our total experience.  
The burdens of judgement affect discussions carried out at all levels (including discussions 
remaining strictly within the limits of the political domain, never invoking any religious or 
otherwise comprehensive belief as deep fundations for oneÕs political convictions). However, they 
are likely to create greater divisions the farther from the political domain an argument for political 
conclusions starts. Here we do not need to contend, contentiously, that debates over, say, religious 
issues (e.g., whether Muslims should believe that in the Yawm ad-Dīn Ð the ÔDay of JudgementÕ Ð 
their resurrected bodies will be the same as the ones they had on earth) are in themselves more 
affected by the burdens of judgements and thus more conducive to divisions than discussions 
about political issues (e.g., the priority of liberty over the fair redistribution of wealth). Likewise, 
																																								 																				
6
	Garsten (2006: 198). 	
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making the same point in the context of hermeneutical arguments, we do not need to suggest that 
the burderns of judgement apply with greater force to (a) the analysis of whether the most plausible 
interpretation of Islamic texts and commentaries supports a belief in the resurrection of earthly 
bodies than to (b) an investigation into whether the priority of liberty follows from the most 
plausible interpretation of a certain tradition of liberal political wiritings.  
What we want to highlight is that conjecture requires conjecturers to, first, start by making 
contentious points about religious problems (as in Clayton and StevensÕs Ôyou-are-mistaken-about-
the-godsÕ view of engagement) or, at least, about religious doctrines (as in MarchÕs attempt to 
establish as the most plausible a certain interpretation of Islamic sources among several others on 
offer), in order then to build consensus at the level of a reasonable political conception. This 
multiple-step structure is integral to conjecture, which, by definition, cannot work on the 
assumption that its audience already see consistency between their religious doctrine and the 
reasonable political ideas that provide the basis for public reason; conjecture works precisely by 
showing that that, if its audience came to think about their religious doctrine under a new light, or 
even made a few changes to their system of religious beliefs, they would then realise that a 
reasonable political conception can be justified from within their religious doctrine.  
The problem with this is that multiplying the argumentative steps that need to be taken also 
multiplies the opportunities for the burdens of judgement to interfere with the reasoning process 
because the argument advanced by the conjecturer will have to deal with vague concepts, complex 
evidence and conflicting considerations at each stage. Due to the cumulative effects of the burdens 
of judgement, the expectation that we can persuade our interlocutors of the value of our reasonable 
political conclusionsÑfor example, of a belief in freedom of expression or even in a reasonable 
general political conception of society as a fair cooperative systemÑbecomes particularly 
unrealistic. 
In sum, the cumulative effects that the burdens of judgement have on conjecture should 
lead us to recognise that it is extremely unlikely that (even apt) conjecturers would be able to 
convince their interlocutors to endorse a reasonable political conception. To reiterate, this 
conclusion applies across all models of conjecture - to the one starting with arguments suggesting 
to their audience that some of their religious beliefs are mistaken, and to the one starting with 
arguments suggesting that the most plausible interpretation of the audienceÕs religious tradition 
actually supports basic liberal democratic political ideas.7  
																																								 																				
7 Note that Schwartzman mentions that reasoning from conjecture is always uncertain, and its speculative nature is in 
part the result of Ôdifferences in judgementÕ (2012: 529). However, he does not explore what this means for persuasion 
and containment. 
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Here it is worth noting that the burdens of judgement, which are usually invoked to explain 
reasonable pluralism, have turned out to be useful also to understand the persistence of at least 
certain kinds of unreasonable disagreement. They clarify why political liberals should be 
particularly sceptical about the prospects of conjecture and should explore, instead, whether there 
are other resources in political liberalism to engage religious citizens drawn to unreasonable ideas.  
 
3.4. Religion and the causes of religious radicalisation 
We have seen that carrying out conjecture persuasively is much more complex than its supporters 
recognise. The gulf between conjecture and real-world counter-radicalisation practices should not 
be surprising also for another reason, concerning the causes of religious radicalisation, which we 
now turn to discuss. In recent years, a vast sociological literature has emerged that examines why 
citizens of broadly liberal democratic countries come to embrace (or be attracted to) extremist 
religious views. Such a literature, which particularly focuses on the causes of Ôhome-grownÕ 
Islamism, identifies different factors that drive persons to religious radicalisation. Although 
scholars disagree on the weight of specific factors, they tend to concur in pointing out that religion, 
including the endorsement of doctrinal beliefs and the interpretation of doctrinal texts, does not 
play a major role in religious radicalisation. To be sure, religion often offers a narrative through 
which non-religious grievances can be framed. However, it is not one of the main driving forces 
behind radicalisation (Abbas and Siddique 2012: 120; Aly and Striegher 2012; Hafez and Mullins 
2015: 966; Perlinger and Milton 2016).  
Scholars argue that the roots of religious radicalisation are social, economic and political. 
For instance, some stress the importance of social and economic disenfranchisement in nourishing 
the grievances that some Muslim citizens experience towards their countries, putting them at risk 
of radicalisation (e.g., Bakker and Bont 2016; Hafez and Mullins 2015; Weggemans, Bakker, and 
Grol 2014). In European states, Muslim citizens Ð especially second and third generations of 
migrants Ð are overrepresented in the lower socio-economic groups of the population and among 
the unemployed. As shown by a recent report on social mobility in the UK, young Muslims face 
enormous barriers in school and in higher education, while seeking employment and at their 
workplace, which seriously undermine their potential to be upwardly socially mobile (Stevenson et 
al. 2017). 
The frustration about social and economic status is also compounded by experiences of 
ethnic discrimination, physical and verbal attacks, and humiliation. As observed by some scholars, 
the reality and perception of living in countries that are increasingly hostile to Muslim identities 
and in which xenophobic sentiments are fuelled by right-wing populist parties and part of the 
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media crucially contribute to persons feeling that they do not belong there. In turn, this may drive 
them towards radicalisation (e.g., Abbas and Siddique 2012; Hafez and Mullins 2015; Weggemans, 
Bakker, and Grol 2014). As we saw in Section 3.1, it is feelings of belonging and attachment that 
some activist and community-based practices of counter-radicalisation, such as MahmoodÕs talks 
about British military history, try to reignite by providing narratives that emphasise the social, 
cultural and economic contribution of Muslims to their European countries.  
Relatedly, scholars also include social networks among the factors leading to radicalisation. 
Feeling alienated from society and isolated within their community, those at risk of radicalisation 
find opportunities to voice their frustration and build ties of solidarity by joining pre-existing 
radicalised networks (Hafez and Mullins 2015: 964Ð66). As explained earlier, preventing and 
tackling isolation through the provision of alternative avenues for socialisation are among the main 
goals of the wide-ranging set of activities organised in municipalities like Aarhus and Mechelen 
and by grassroots associations like Engage. 
To sum up, as Olivier Roy contends, even in the case of those who eventually resort to 
violence, radicalisation is not about Ôthe radicalisation of IslamÕ but about Ôthe Islamisation of 
radicalisationÕ (Roy 2017: 42). Persons Ôdo not become radicals because they have misread the 
textsÕ (Roy 2017: 42). Indeed, as observed by others, the very use of the expression Ôreligious 
radicalismÕ may be misleading as it suggests that religion is somehow at the root of the problem 
(e.g., Abbas and Siddique: 125; Kundnani 2015). In this sense, although the political liberal 
literature on conjecture is ultimately driven by the belief that Islamic texts are compatible with 
loyalty to a liberal democratic state, it still endorses a Ôtheological approach to radicalisationÕ, which 
conceives of radicalisation as Ôa product of how Islam is interpretedÕ and has been proved to be 
flawed (Kundnani 2015: 16). By reducing radicalisation to individualsÕ doctrinal mistakes or 
confusion, the proponents of conjecture miscomprehend the roots of religious radicalisation, 
thereby neglecting the actual political, social and economic causes of the phenomenon. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks, or, why a Different Political Liberalism is Possible  
The main goal of this paper has been to critically evaluate conjecture, a popular concept among 
political liberals, as a tool of persuasion that can help put the stability of liberal democratic 
institutions on firmer ground. Our critical analysis has found conjecture to be flawed because over-
intellectualistic Ð (1) in exaggerating the role that citizens can plausibly play in persuasively 
challenging or otherwise discussing religious doctrines; (2) in losing sight of a key political liberal 
lesson about how difficult it is to create unity on the basis of doctrinal discussions; and (3) in 
assuming that religious personsÕ opposition to liberal democracy has doctrinal roots.  
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In conclusion, we wish to briefly note how the initial expectation that Rawlsian political 
liberalism would be able to help us think about counter-radicalisation was not entirely misplaced. 
Conjecture has turned out to be flawed, but RawlsÕs political liberalism contains alternative and 
underexplored resources that, if they received the attention they deserve, could provide much 
better guidance regarding counter-radicalisation and the fight against extreme views more in 
general. 
When Rawls discusses what could provide an appropriate basis of the motivation to accept 
liberal democratic institutions, his focus is on the idea of a desire to act in a way appropriate to the 
kind of person citizens wish to become or, more specifically, a Ôdesire to act in ways worthy of a 
reasonable and equal citizenÕ (Rawls 1996: 85). This acknowledgement of the importance, when it 
comes to motivation, of the image we have of the sort of person we wish to be comes with the 
further acknowledgment that our desire to be recognised by others as that sort of person is also crucial; 
when describing the citizens populating stable liberal democracies, Rawls explains that Ônot only 
are they normal and fully cooperating members of society, but they further want to be, and to be 
recognized as, such membersÕ (Rawls 1996: 81). This amounts to a recognition of the fundamental 
importance of a sense of identity, which has come up a few times in our discussion of the causes 
of radicalisation and promising initiatives to counter it. 
RawlsÕs interesting insight allows us to reframe many of the questions we have asked about 
counter-radicalisation and containment. We can now ask, how can societies try to ensure, 
consistently with the basic values of political liberalism, that citizens will want to be (and be 
recognised as) the right sorts of persons or, in other words, will develop the right sense of identity? 
Rawls briefly considers this question, mentioning the role Ôas educatorÕ that public reason can play 
when it governs law- and policy-making. When the basic structure of society is really shaped by 
political decisions serving liberal democratic values like equal liberties for all, equality of 
opportunity and the like, and when justifications are publicly offered for such decisions, grounding 
them in an ideal of society where citizens really are treated as free and equal, this system will Ôrealize 
a social world within which the ideal of citizenship can be learned and may elicit an effective desire 
to be that kind of personÕ (Rawls 1996: 71). An obvious corollary is that we surely cannot expect 
anyone to develop a sense of identity as reasonable and equal citizens as long as their society 
systematically disenfranchise and leave them behind, as described in Section 3.4 with regard to 
Muslims.8 
																																								 																				
8 It is worth highlighting how RawlsÕs insight into how citizens can develop the right sense of identity suggests that 
we should structurally reform our society so as to guarantee that citizens are really treated as free and equal. The 
suggestion is not simply that we should ensure that citizens are offered public justifications, grounded on ideals of 
society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons, for the political decisions that happen to be 
debated at present while leaving entrenched injustices in place. 
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Another interesting place where Rawls appears to steer clear of over-intellectualism is his 
analysis of the forces that might create and then consolidate over time a following for 
reasonableness. There he very explicitly states that Ôallegiance to a principle of [reasonable] political 
justiceÕ does not generally Ôdepend on the knowledge of or the belief in its derivation from a 
comprehensive viewÕ (Rawls 1996: 159-160). He even claims that most citizens hold Ôpartially 
comprehensiveÕ doctrines, which comprise only some, but not nearly all, beliefs concerning the 
most important religious, philosophical and moral questions, and which provide at most a loose 
articulation of such beliefs. The prevalence of partially comprehensive doctrines, which is in line 
with the sociological literature on radicalisation we have discussed earlier, is extremely important. 
Such doctrines leave the room, within citizensÕ mindsets, for political liberal democratic ideas to 
take root due to their appearing reasonable in themselves. Among other things, this means that 
when liberal democratic principles start being applied in practice, Ôit is possible for citizens first to 
appreciate the good those principles accomplish both for themselves and those they care for, as 
well as for society at large, and then to affirm them on this basisÕ (Rawls 1996: 160). 
Although, in that passage, Rawls seems mainly to refer to formal institutions and the example 
they set when they are well-ordered, it is possible to interpret the relevant forms of political practice 
much more broadly. For instance, take actual persons from a religious (e.g. Muslim) community 
who endorse liberal democratic values and, embodying a Muslim identity, can show in practice 
that such identity is perfectly compatible with an allegiance to liberal democratic institutions and 
with a happy life under those institutions. They can play a pivotal role in inspiring others who, 
instead, may doubt that Islam and liberal democracy are practically compatible in this way. Positive 
role models do not simply include very prominent figures (e.g., Sadiq Khan, the first Muslim mayor 
of London), although the symbolic value that high-profile role models have, especially for young 
persons, should not be underestimated (Khalaf 2016; Saeed 2018: 51). Indeed, the importance of 
having positive role models is directly incorporated into the practices of counter-radicalisation that 
we have discussed, which include mentoring efforts, as illustrated by the programme implemented 
by the Danish city of Aarhus. In addition to offering information and support for participants, 
mentors can become persons to look up to and being inspired by. More generally, leaders who are 
held in high esteem within a community and are committed to liberal democratic values can 
provide a concrete and attainable role model of citizenship and social inclusion that other 
community members can relate to and be motivated to imitate. 
Although discussed in a non-exhaustive manner, these resources Rawls has to offer already 
open at least three promising directions for future research. First, discursive engagement will have 
to be rethought as the engagement of persons who normally hold partially comprehensive 
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doctrines, taking little interest in the connections between their political commitments and 
religious or other comprehensive views. How can we conduct this sort of engagement ethically, 
consistently with autonomy and the other values of political liberalism?9 Second, to be plausible, 
any account of discursive engagement aimed at improving the stability of liberal democratic 
institutions should be coupled with a normative theory of the responsibilities of political 
institutions not only in directly creating fair terms of social cooperation, but also in shaping those 
terms so that citizens can develop the right motivation to accept them, and reasonableness can 
spread in society. Third, we should examine the different ways in which liberal democratic ideas 
can be appreciated in themselves, in practice, beyond the formal forums of public reason and 
within society at large. For example, we should analyse the importance of having role-models 
embodying the compatibility between a specific cultural and religious identity, a commitment to 
liberal democratic values and a fulfilled life under liberal democratic arrangements. If political 
liberals prioritise these research areas more than conjecture, chances are they will finally be able to 
provide valuable guidance regarding counter-radicalisation and containment more in general. 
 
References 
Abbas, Tahir, and Assma Siddique. 2012. ÒPerceptions of the Processes of Radicalisation and de-
Radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a Post-Industrial City.Ó Social Identities 
18 (1): 119Ð34. 
Aly, Anne, and Jason-Leigh Striegher. 2012. ÒExamining the Role of Religion in Radicalization to 
Violent Islamist Extremism.Ó Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35 (12): 849Ð62. 
Badano, Gabriele, and Alasia Nuti. 2018. ÒUnder Pressure: Political Liberalism, the Rise of 
Unreasonableness, and the Complexity of Containment.Ó Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2): 
145Ð68.  
Bakker, Edwin, and Roel de Bont. 2016. ÒBelgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012Ð
2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Syria and Iraq.Ó Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 27 (5): 837Ð57. 
Bertelsen, Peter. 2015. ÒDanish Preventive Measures and Deradicalization Strategies: The Aarhus 
Model.Ó Panorama Ð Insights to Asian and European Affairs, no. 1: 241Ð53. 
Clayton, Matthew, and David Stevens. 2014. ÒWhen God Commands Disobedience: Political 
Liberalism and Unreasonable Religions.Ó Res Publica 20 (1): 65Ð84. 
Crouch, David, and Jon Henley. 2015. ÒA Way Home for Jihadis: DenmarkÕs Radical Approach 
to Islamic Extremism.Ó The Guardian. February 23, 2015. 
																																								 																				
9 Badano and Nuti (2018) conduct an initial exploration of this question. 
19 
	
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/home-jihadi-denmark-radical-islamic-
extremism-aarhus-model-scandinavia. 
EUobserver. 2016. ÒMechelen: The Belgian City with No Foreign Fighters.Ó April 26. 
https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/133185. 
Ferrara, Alessandro. 2014. The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Garsten, Bryan. 2006. Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press. 
Hafez, Mohammed, and Creighton Mullins. 2015. ÒThe Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical 
Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism.Ó Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 38 (11): 958Ð75. 
Henley, Jon. 2014. ÒHow Do You Deradicalise Returning Isis Fighters?Ó The Guardian, November 
12, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-
jihadists-denmark-syria. 
Khalaf Roula. 2016. ÒSadiq Khan Offers New Role Model for Young European Muslims.Ó 
Financial Times, May, 11 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/3ff05dee-15d6-11e6-b197-
a4af20d5575e  
Kundnani, Arun. 2015. ÒRadicalisation: The Journey of a Concept.Ó In Counter-Radicalisation: Critical 
Perspectives, edited by Christopher Baker-Beall, Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis, 14Ð35. 
Oxon-New York: Routledge. 
March, Andrew F. 2009. Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Perlinger, Arie, and Daniel Milton. 2016. ÒFrom Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign 
Fighters in Iraq and Syria.Ó Washington (DC): Combating Terrorism Center. 
https://ctc.usma.edu/from-cradle-to-grave-the-lifecycle-of-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-and-
syria/. 
Quong, Jonathan. 2004. ÒThe Rights of Unreasonable Citizens.Ó Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (3): 
314Ð35. 
Rabasa, Angel, and Cheryl Benard. 2015. Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in 
Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. Paperback edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
ÑÑÑ. 1997. ÒThe Idea of Public Reason Revisited.Ó The University of Chicago Law Review 64 (3): 
765Ð807. 
Roy, Olivier. 2017. Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. London: Hurst & Company. 
20 
	
Saeed, Tania. 2018. ÒEducation and Disengagement: Extremism and the Perception of Muslim 
Students.Ó in Education and Extremisms: Rethinking Liberal Pedagogies in the Contemporary World, 
edited by Farid Penjawani, Lynn Revell, Reza Gholami and Mile Diboll, 45-59. Oxon-New 
York: Routledge. 
Schmid, Alex P. 2013. ÒRadicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual 
Discussion and Literature Review.Ó The Hague: International Centre for Counterterrorism,. 
https://icct.nl/publication/radicalisation-de-radicalisation-counter-radicalisation-a-
conceptual-discussion-and-literature-review/. 
Schwartzman, Micah. 2012. ÒThe Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture.Ó Journal of Moral Philosophy 
9 (4): 521Ð44. 
Shabi, Rachel. 2016. ÒDeradicalising Britain: The Activists Turning Young Muslims Away from 
Extremism.Ó The Guardian. March 18, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/mar/18/deradicalising-britain-the-activists-turning-young-muslims-away-
from-extremism. 
Stevenson, Jacqueline, et al. 2017. ÒThe Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims.Ó 
London: Social Mobility Commission. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/64222
0/Young_Muslims_SMC.pdf. 
Thomas, Paul. 2015. ÒPrevent and Community Cohesion in Britain: The Worst of All Possible 
World.Ó In Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, edited by Christopher Baker-Beall, 
Charlotte Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis, 36Ð53. Oxon-New York: Routledge. 
Weggemans, Daan, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol. 2014. ÒWho Are They and Why Do They Go? 
The Radicalization and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters.Ó 
Perspectives on Terrorism 8 (4). 
Wong, Baldwin. Forthcoming. ÒConjecture and the Division of Justificatory Labour: A Comment 
on Clayton and Stevens.Ó Res Publica, 1Ð7. 
 
